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THE FUTURE OF LABOR LAW: A MISMATCH
BETWEEN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND INDUSTRIAL REALITY?t
DONNA SOCKELL *
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act),' governing
private sector labor relations in the United States, was designed to
foster collective bargaining or to give employees the free choice of
whether to be represented by a labor organization. 2 According to
the statute, Congress saw collective bargaining as a means to redress
the economic disadvantage faced by an individual employee at-
tempting to negotiate employment terms directly with his or her
employer); Although Congress enacted the original statute more
-1 Copyright © 1989 Prof. Donna Sockell
'0
 The author is an Associate Professor of Business, Graduate School of Business, Colum-
bia University. She received her Ph. D. in Industrial Relations from the New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1982. She is coeditor of the
research annual ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH ( JAI Press). She
wishes to thank John Delaney, Jim Kuhn, and David Lewin for valuable comments on an
earlier version of this draft, Diane Gherson and Mitchell Langbert for their helpful insights,
and Karen Buroff and Maya Grone for their research assistance. Although this research was
partially funded by Columbia University, via its Graduate School of Business Faculty Research
Fellowship Program, the views expressed herein are exclusively the author's.
1 29 U.S.C. § 151-69 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2 That this was the intent of the NLRA is indicated by the findings and policy section of
the Act, cited and excerpted infra note 3. Section 7 of the NLRA, which represents the heart
of the Act and the source of employees' protections and rights, also reflects this intent.
Section 7 provides in part that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
5 Based on a literal reading of the statute, Congress believed that the bargaining power
inequality and the failure of emploYers to recognize employees' representatives contributed
to harmful industrial strife. Tide 1, section 1 of the NLRA states that: "The inequality of
bargaining power between employees and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce,
and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions by depressing wage rates and the
purchasing power of wage earners ...." 29 U.S.C. ii 151. Moreover, because Congress
believed that collective bargaining might contain that strife, it was
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and proce-
dure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
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than fifty years ago,4 its words have undergone little change in the
past forty years.' Over this span of time, the social, political, and
economic forces that partly shape the context in which labor law
operates, and, indeed, give meaning to or alter the meaning of the
law, 6 have undergone substantial modification. This paper identifies
several critical areas of the NLRA that will need to undergo change
if the Act is to retain its vitality in contemporary times. Indeed, an
array of societal forces challenges the ability of the NLRA to foster
collective bargaining over employees' employment concerns. Such
forces include: blurring distinctions among blue and white collar
workers, professionals and nonprofessionals, supervisors/managers
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives ()I'
their own choosing....
Id.
There is much debate about the actual underlying purposes of the NLRA. For a discus-
sion of possible aims of the Act, see, e.g., Barron, A Theory of Protected Employee Rights: A
Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme Couri's Interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act, 59
TEX. L. REV. 421 (1981); Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: 50 Years of the National Labor
Relations Board as Seen by Former Chairmen, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7 (1985); Klaredutlicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941 62
MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
'The basis for the regulation of collective bargaining in the private sector, known as the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or the Wagner Act, was enacted in 1935.
5 Congress enacted I he Taft-Hartley Act, also known as the Labor Management Relations
Act (LM RA) in 1947, and incorporated almost all the words of the Wagner Act. Together,
these Acts constitute the legal framework governing unionization in the private sector. The
only statutory modifications of this framework were enacted in 1959 (Labor-Management
Reporting Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519) and 1974 (Public Law 93-360,
88 Stat. 395). These amendments, however, may be viewed as peripheral to the central thrust
of labor law. The LMRDA deals primarily with the internal affairs of union, and Public Law
93-360 relates to the coverage of hospitals and health care institutions by the NLRA. As
such these amendments do not significantly modify collective bargaining.
The role that the law plays in molding reality has long been the subject of debate
among observers of labor law. Compare, e.g., Dunlop, Public Regulation of Collective Bargaining,
A.B.A. SEC. LAB. REL. L. 47 (1953) wait Klare, supra note 3.
The relationship between law and the social consensus or norms has long been the
subject of research by scholars outside of the field of law. For examples of such work, see
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: A STRUCTURAL, PERSPECTIVE (W. Evans ed. 1980); 1 F. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 105 (1973). There have always been a few scholars who have
asserted that these forces determine the law, or that the law, at best, is a simple translation
of a social consensus (which it has no or little hand in shaping). Recently, this view, akin to
an environmentally deterministic perspective on law, received some support in R. FLANAGAN,
LABOR Rt:Licrioxs AND TIM LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1987). Flanagan has argued that cyclical
shifts in the partisanship of the NLRB and changes in Board rules have little impact on
litigation. instead, economic factors, such as the union/nonunion wage differential, help
shape how parties behave with respect to the law. But for a different view on the importance
of legislation. conducted in the public sector, see Saltzman, Bargaining Laws as a Cause and
Consequence of the Growth of Teacher Unionism 38 1NDVS. & LAB. REI.. REV. 335 (1985).
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and nonmanagerial employees; expanding interests among a better
educated workforce; continuing challenge to the international com-
petitiveness of United Suites firms; the growing use of employee
participation plans; increasing sophistication of employers' anti-
union tactics; and emerging telecommunications networks and Ca-
Specifically, this paper, which consists of six sections, will con-
centrate on the possible impact of those interrelated societal forces
on five important areas of the NLRA. Section I examines coverage
by and exclusion from the NLRA — that is, who is eligible to receive
the Act's protections. This first section shows that the legally-fos-
tered right to engage in collective bargaining appears to be enjoyed
by fewer and fewer individuals, given the somewhat narrow appli-
cation of employee status's by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) and the courts. The diminution of the size of the
population qualifying as employees, likely to continue into the fu-
ture, is attributed to blurring occupational identities and the grow-
ing number of independent contractors." The section concludes that
the promise of NLRA protections may become an empty one for
the contemporary and future workforce unless changes are made
in the way employee status is determined.
In section II, the focus of the paper shifts to the legality of
nonunion forms of collective representation, known as employee
participation plans.'" These plans, used increasingly by United
Although there will always be disagreement over whether labor law is a passive reflec-
tion of industrial reality or a critical force that actually shapes that reality, most legal scholars
would probably agree that labor law helps shape the reality it reflects. Specifically, most
scholars believe that NLRB approaches to deciding cases affect the collective bargaining
process and outcomes; indeed, the vast majority of legal research is devoted implicitly or
explicitly to descriptive, speculative, or prescriptive analyses of Ibis impact. At the same time,
however, scholars generally recognize that NLRB rules partly reflect some underlying social
concensus in the industrial community or in the larger society. This consensus is likely shaped
by a myriad of social, political, and economic forces. This paper focuses on these dynamic
forces' likely impact on the meaningfulness of labor law, which is less frequently' the direct
subject of legal research and commentary.
" Eligibility for coverage by the NLRA is determined by whether an individual qualifies
as an "employee" under the Act. Employee status is defined and discussed infra at note 13
and accompanying text.
" "Independent contractors, - or individuals who arc deemed to work for themselves, are
explicitly denied employee status by the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), quoted infra note 13.
Although the NLRA does not define what it means to be art indepenclem contractor, labor
tribunals have used various tests to identify independent contractors. These tests are discussed
infra at notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
"' "Employee participation plan" may refer to a wide variety of workplace initiatives,
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States employers, may be designed to avoid or to circumvent the
union, on the one hand, or to enhance morale and productivity, on
the other. This section suggests that the continued use and recent,
favorable treatment of participation plans by some courts may
threaten the ability of the NLRA to foster bargaining (as union
alternatives receive further legitimacy).
Sections III and IV consider the scope of collective bargaining
and remedies under the NLRA. Section III argues that the con-
traction in the array of issues over which management and labor
are compelled by law to negotiate strikes at the heart of organized
labor's bargaining entitlements." Thus, in a subtle way, the role
that unions and bargaining can play in our society can and has
become increasingly limited. In section IV, the long-heralded ar-
guments about the inadequacy of remedies for employer abuses of
the Act are reconsidered. In light of recent decisions dissipating the
expected costs for breaking the law, coupled with the growth in the
number and sophistication of employer unfair labor practices, sec-
tion IV concludes that expectation of compliance with the NLRA
may become increasingly unrealistic.
Finally, in section V, the meaningfulness of rules restricting the
conditions under which employees may seek to gather support for
a union or may distribute union organizing literature (so-called "no-
solicitation" and "no-distribution" rules) is examined. 12 This section
argues that the development and growing use of microprocessing
technology may challenge the usefulness of such rules. This paper
then concludes with a discussion of the significance of these chal-
lenges to the vitality of labor law and the argument that the law
undergirding unionization will need to be reinvigorated if society
wishes to continue to foster collective bargaining.
including quality of worklife experiments, gain-sharing or productivity-sharing relationships
(such as Scanlon or Rucker Plans), junior boards of directors, or suggestion boxes. The
essence of these plans is that they involve some forum, typically outside a union model,
through which employees can achieve some say in their work or worklives.
" The NLRA requires that both unions and employers, at each other's request, negotiate
about subjects falling within the statutory phrase "wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment." See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (6)(3), (d). The scope of bargaining is
discussed at length infra at notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
No specific statutory provision deals explicitly with the legality' of no-solicitation and
no-distribution rules. Instead, the validity of such rules is derived from interpretation of the
prohibition of employer attempts "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by section 7," established as an unfair labor practice by
§ 8(a)(1) of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
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1. EXCLUSIONS: BLURRING OCCUPATIONAL IDENTITIES AND THE
GROWING NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The meaningfulness of the NLRA is contingent on whether or
not any sizeable group of workers is eligible for its coverage: That
is, there must be a substantial number of individuals who meet the
NLRA's definition of "employee."' 3 Simply stated, without coverage
the Act is a nullity. The effectiveness of the Act is also based sig-
nificantly on an ability to distinguish employees from nonemploy-
ees. Yet, it appears that at least two forces may challenge the Act's
reach and the ability to distinguish employees from certain nonem-
ployees (such as supervisors," managers,'' and independent
contractors 16) and also to draw lines between classes of employees
who are given different rights under the NLRA, such as proles-
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). "Employees" are defined in 2(3) as including
any employee, and shall nut be limited to the employees of a particular em-
ployer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed
by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
As this definition suggests, employee status is determined by exclusion. That is, if an indi-
vidual is not disqualified by membership in any excepted category, he or she is deemed to
he an employee.
" Supervisors are denied coverage by the NLRA, as they are expressly excepted from
the definition of employee in 2(3). Section 2(11) of the Act defines a "supervisor" as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use or independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
' 5 Managers are excluded from coverage by the NLRA by interpretation rather than
explicit statutory language. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974.),
Although managerial status is not defined by the Act, labor tribunals use tests to distinguish
managers from nonmanagers. These tests are discussed in Bell, and infra in the text accom-
panying notes 22-25.
)" Like supervisors, independent contractors are expressly excepted from the employee
category defined in § 2(3). Though independent contractor status is not defined by the Act,
labor tribunals use tests to identify these self-employed individuals. These tests are discussed
infra at notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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sionals and nonprofessionals)' These forces include blurring oc-
cupational classifications and identities, and the growing number of
independent contractors.
A. Blurring Occupational Classifications
For the purposes of applying the NLRA, the classification of
individuals as employees, professional employees, managers, or su-
pervisors is significant. But are distinctions among these classifica-
tions clearly drawn by application of the NLRA and, moreover, can
we apply them to the contemporary workforce? The language of
the NLRA, and the cases interpreting it, would seem to imply that
supervisors, professionals, managers, and nonmanagers can be
clearly distinguished from one another. According to the statute,
for example, supervisors are individuals who have the authority, in
the interest of the employer, to "hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
ployees . . . ,"" and rather than exercising this authority in a "rou-
tine" manner, they use "independent judgment." Because supervi-
sors possess the authority to perform one or more of these job
functions, they are assumed to have an allegiance to the employer
— a loyalty or identification that might be jeopardized if they be-
came unionized.'" Therefore, supervisors are excluded from cov-
erage by the NLRA.
" As discussed in the text, professionals are given the statutory right to he excluded
from bargaining units of nonprofessionals. 29 U.S.C. § 159031(1) (1982). Section 2(12) of the
Act defines a "professional" to be
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied
in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical
work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its
performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv)
requiring knowledge of alt advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction
and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished
from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training
in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellec-
tual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is
performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to
qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29	 § 152(12) (1982).
' 5 Id. § 152(11).
' In addition, some scholars argue that supervisory unionism would give labor organi-
zations too much power over employers, impair efficiency, and deprive management of
control over its business. For scholarly comment on the wisdom of such arguments, see, e.g..
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Using remarkably similar language to define professional em-
ployees, the NLRA provides coverage to professionals; according
to the Act, the work of professionals is "predominantly intellectual
and varied in character as opposed to routine" and involves the
exercise of "discretion and judgment." 2" Yet, although the Act treats
professionals and supervisors differently, it also recognizes a differ-
ence between professionals and other employees eligible for cov-
erage by the NLRA. Section 9(b)(1), for example, gives professional
employees the statutory right to be excluded from bargaining units
of nonprofessional employees. 2 ' This special right is predicated on
the view that professionals have interests that differ from those of
nonprofessionals.
Adding to the complexities of the
	
distinctions among in-
dividuals eligible and ineligible for the Act's coverage in the face of
unclear or overlapping statutory language is the treatment of man-
agerial employees. Although managerial employees are not ex-
plicitly denied bargaining rights by the NLRA, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the Act was not designed to protect
those employees.22 To determine whether or not an employee is a
manager, labor tribunals consider whether or not the individual is
closely related to or aligned with management or is in a position to
"formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies." 23 In
the view of labor tribunals, the unionization of individuals meeting
these tests of managerial status would jeopardize employers' inter-
ests because management's loyalties would be divided. 24 The prob-
Lederer, Afanagemenrs Right to Loyalty of Supervisors, 32 LAB. L.J. 83, 89, 103 (1981); Petro,
True Supervisory Status, i LAB. L.J. 754 (1950); Raimon, Management, Union and Public. Policy
on the Railroads and Airlines, 11 INnus. & LAB. REL. REV. 551, 552 (1958); Rains, Collective
Bargaining in the Public Sector and the Need for the Exclusion of Supervisory Personnel, 23 LAS.
L.J. 275 (1972); Note, Collective Bargaining by Supervisory Employees Under the Wagner Act, 13
U. Cut. L. Rev, 332, 334 (1946). For a review or the arguments about the supervisory
exclusions from the NLRA, see Delaney, Lewin, & Sockell, The NLRA at Fifty: A Research
Appraisal and Agenda, 39 iNDus. & LAB. Rio.. Rev. 46, 49 (1985).
211 29 U.S.C. § 152(12).
2 ' Section 9(b)(1) states that the Board .shall not "decide that any unit is appropriate For
such purposes 1f such unit. includes both professional employees and employees who are nor
professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion
in such unit ...." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1).
22 NLRB. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 297, 274-75 (1974).
21 Ford Motor Co„ 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946); see also Begin & Lee, NLRA Exclusion
Criteria and Profes,sional Work, 26 iNDDS. REL. 83, 84 (1987); LallECUIL The Issue of Collective
Bargaining fin School Supervisors and Administrators, 31 LAB. L.J. 153 (198(1).
° See cases and articles cited supra notes 22-23. In addition, insightful discussions of the
tests used to distinguish managers from noinnanagers may be found in Barney, Bell Aerospace
and the Status of Managerial Employees Under the NLRA, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 346 (1976); Kohler,
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hem with these tests is that, in application, many professional em-
ployees who may engage in some, albeit small, degree of self-
governance (associated with attempts to maintain occupational per-
formance) would be classified as managers. In so doing, professional
employees would be excluded from the Act's protections, rendering
section 2(12), which affords them coverage, meaningless. 25
Indeed, this concern has motivated, in large part, the wide-
spread criticism of the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v. Yeshiva
University. 2" Specifically, many commentators have expressed the
concern that the Supreme Court's approach to classifying faculty
members at Yeshiva as managers will likely be used to exclude from
the Act's protections not only academics at other institutions, but
also many nonacademic professionals, including nurses, engineers,
and a rch itects. 27
Given the potential overlap in how the NLRA and case law
define supervisors, professionals, and managers, it is not clear
whether distinctions among these categories of workers were ever
easy to apply. Part of the difficulty in applying these distinctions
may rest in the fact that they are grounded in untested assumptions
about differences among these groups of workers 28 and similarities
Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2),27 B.C.L. Rev. 499,
541-42 (1986); Walm, Collective Bargaining !tights of Managerial Employees in the United States
and Canada, 27 LAIL L.J. 343 (1976); see also infra note 26 and the articles cited therein.
25 See Angel, Professionals and Unionization, 66 MINN. L. Rev. 383,387 (1983); Delaney,
Lewin, & Sockell, .supra note 19, at 49. The text of § 2(12), defining professional employees,
is quoted supra note 17.
26
 444 U.S. 672 (1980). In that case, Yeshiva University opposed the union's petition for
a certification election to be held among all hill-time faculty members at 10 of its 13 schools,
on the grounds that faculty members were managers. After reviewing congressional history
and intent and the faculty's role in the governance of the schools, the Supreme Court
concluded that the actual functions served by faculty members at Yeshiva's school qualified
them as managers. The Court noted that, t Jo the extent the industrial analogy applies, the
faculty determines within each school, the product to be produced, the terms upon which it
will be offered, and the customers who will he served." ld. at 686. In reaching the conclusion
that these faculty members should be excluded from the NLRA's protections, the Court was
concerned about preserving the undivided loyalty of faculty members to the schools — a
loyalty that might be jeopardized by unionization. See id. at 682,688-90.
Yeshiva has been the subject of extensive legal commentary. See, e.g„ Ashlock, The Bar-
gaining Status of College and University Professors Under the National Labor Relation., Laws, 35
LAB. L.J. 103 (1984); Douglas, Distinguishing Yeshiva: A Troubling Task for the NLRB, 34 LAB.
L.j..104 (1983); Suntrup, NLRB v. Yeshiva University and Unionization in Higher Education,
4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 297 (1981); Note, Collective Authority and Technical Expertise: Reexamining
the Managerial Employee Exclusion, 56 N.V.U. L. Rev. 694 (1981),
27 See, e.g., Klare, The Bitter and the Sweet: Reflections on the Supreme COUris Yeshiva Decision,
71 Socifius• Rev. 99,101 (1983). Interestingly, the Supreme Court did note that it was "not
suggesting an application of managerial status1t.:tat would sweep all professionals outside the
ACC in derogation of Congress' expressed intent to protect them." Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690.
" A similar conclusion is reached by Delaney, Lewin, & Sockell, .supra note 19, at 50.
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among workers within a group (e.g., professionals are more like
each other than they are like managers or supervisors). Yet, precious
little research has illustrated any differences among identifications,
allegiances, and interests of these different groups of workers. 29
The reality may well be that within any group there has always been
a substantial diversity of interests and allegiances that has cut across
definitions of employee groups, as drawn by the Act." What is clear
is that, however difficult it has been in the past to distinguish among
workers, it would seem to be increasingly more difficult today. The
following employment trends and innovations may prove to be an
insurmountable challenge to the meaningfulness of the Act's cur-
rent definitions of employee groups.
First, the working population has become increasingly profes-
sionalized, and a much higher proportion of it maintains managerial
jobs today than years ago. As Table 1 reveals, the Census Bureau
estimated that 55 percent of the employed labor force occupied
managerial, professional, and technical jobs in 1985, compared to
just 33 percent in 1940 (shortly after the NLRA was enacted).'"
Moreover, in just the fifteen-year period between 1970 and 1985,
the managerial and professional workforce has grown by over 70
percent and has increased from 48 to 55 percent of the employed
labor force. As the more disaggregated data on managers illustrate,
the vast proportion of this growth has come from the more than
29 The limited extant research in this area has generated ambiguous conclusions about
the similarities/dissimilarities among different classes of workers. See Buchholz, The Work
Ethic Reconsidered, 31 INous. & LAB. REL. REV. 450, 459 (1978); Locke & Whiting, Sources of
Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction among Solid Waste Management Employees, 59 J. APPLIED PSY-
CHOLOGY 145, 153-55 (1974). Instead, research on interests and attitudes tends to reveal
that organizational attachment and commitment, for example, arc related to factors such as
age and tenure. See, e.g., Buchanan, Building in Work Organizations, 19 AuMIN. Su, Q. 533,
544-45 (1974); Fukami & Larson, Commitment to Company and Union: Parallel Models, 69 J.
APPLIED PsYcitot.ocv 367, 370-71 (1984); Hall & Scheider, Correlates of Organizational Iden-
tification as a Function of Career Pattern and Organizational Type, 15. ADMIN. Set. Q, 340, 347—
49 (1970); Welsch & LeVan, Inter-Relationships Between Organizational Commitment and Job
Characteristics, Job Satisfaction, Professional Behavior and Organizational Climate, 34 Hum. REL.
1079, 1086-87 (1981),
5" Even the National Labor Relations Board has from time to time recognized a distinc-
tion among high level and low level supervisors. For example, the supervisors' level has been
deemed important in the context of determining whether their involvement in unions con-
stitutes unlawful domination of a union in violation of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. A.L. Mechling
Barge Lines, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 592 (1972); Nassau & Suffolk Contractors Ass'n, 118
N.L.R.B. 174 (1957); see also Kesselring & Brinker, Employer Domination Under Section. 8(a)(2),
30 LAB. L.J. 340 (1979) (discussing these two cases). This would seem to suggest that the
Board also recognizes that supervisors may not be a homogeneous group.
Ks In the data reported by the census before 1970, professionals and technical employees
were treated as single category. This treatment prohibits us from uncovering the growth of
managers and professionals alone over the 45 year time period considered.
996	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:987
100 percent growth in the number of managers employed from
1970 to 1985. By comparison, the size of the operatives and laborers
group, in combination with the craftsmen category, grew only 11
percent from 1970 to 1985. Further, as a percentage of the labor
force, this group declined from nearly 40 percent in 1950 to 28
percent in 1985. These trends suggest that employment has shifted
towards those individuals whose eligibility for the Act's coverage is
dubious or, at best, unclear - managers and professionals - and
has shifted away from those blue collar workers traditionally asso-
ciated with collective bargaining - operatives and craftsmen.
Second, some have argued that white collar and professional
workers are increasingly finding employment in large, bureaucratic
TABLE I,
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMPLOYED WORKFORCE,
1940-1985A
Classification
(in 000's)
1985 5
(%)
1980
(%)
1970
(%u)
1960e
(%)
1950C
(%)
1940e
(%)
Managers 12,221 10,134 5,882
(11) (10) (3 )
Managers and Professionals 25,851 22,152 14,530 -
(24) (23) (19)
Technical, Saks, and 33,231 29,594 22,347
Administrative Support (31) (30) (29)
Subtotal (Managerial, 59,082 51,746 36,877 26,375 20,749 14,657
Prof., Technical) (55) (53) (48) (41) (37) (33)
Service Occupations 14,441 12,629 9,708 7,472 5,694 5,275
(13.5) (13) (13) (12) (10) (12)
Precision, Production, Craft,
and Repair
13,340
(12)
12,594
(13)
10,800
(14)
8,945
(14)
7,773
(14)
5,152
(11)
Operators, Fabricators, and 16,816 17,859 16,263 14,670 14,324 10,955
Laborers (16) (18) (21) (23) (25) (24)
Subtotal 30,156 30,453 27,063 23,615 22,097 16,107
(28) (31) (35) (37) (39) (35)
Farming, Forestry and Fishing 3,470 2,811 2,906 3,994 6,945 8,430
(3 ) (3) (4) (6) (12) (19)
ToTALD 107,150 97,639 76,553 64,639 56,225 44,888
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
A Data for this table were compiled from United States Census figures, gathered every
ten years from 1940-1980. Data reported for 1985 were gathered from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States _(1986).
B This percentage refers to the percent of the employed labor three in the occupational
group.
C Figure includes employed workforce aged 14 years or older.
I) Figures and percentages may total incorrectly due to rounding errors and because of
unreported occupational classifications (prior to 1970).
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organizations akin to those employing blue collar workers. 32 Because
of this, many white collar and professional workers may similarly
lack authority in their respective organizations and find themselves
equally lacking in influence over decisionmaking (as individuals) as
their blue collar counterparts." In other words, professionals who
once might have had managerial responsibilities may now be su-
pervised by administrative staffs. 34 As a consequence, distinctions
among blue and white collar workers may be blurring." This phe-
nomenon may be reflected in the fact that unionization among
workers falling within the category of professionals has increased
substantially in recent years. 3 t3
Third, complementing the movement of white collar work to-
ward a more traditional form of blue collar work has been the
increasing "professionalism" of blue collar workers through the use
of employee participation plans. The number of these plans, which
have purportedly given nonmanagerial employees more authority,
discretion, or say in their organizations, has increased dramatically
in the past decade.' Assuming that these programs have achieved
some redistribution of authority, then blue collar employees may
92 See Angel, supra note 25, at 384-87; Craver, The Vitality of American Labor Movement in
the Twenty -First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 650-51 (1983). Unfortunately, although
the argument that blue and white collar work is converging seenis plausible, it is based on
mostly impressionist ic evidence. Data to test this hypothesis, such as the average establishment.
size by job classilication, are unavailable.
"See Craver, supra note 32, at 651.
g4 See Angel, .supra note 25, at 393; Suntrap, supra note 26, at 307,
" Of course, from a Marxist perspective, these types of workers have never been differ-
ent, aSSilining neither owns the means of production. For an excellent discussion of this
point, see R. Hymns), 1NotiSTRIAL. RELATIONS: A MARxIST Isrritonucrtost 41 (1975).
36 During the period frimi 1974 to 1980, a time when the percentage or the labor force
that was unionized declined or held roughly constant, unionization among professional,
technical and kindred workers increased from 13.8 to 22.9 percent of all such workers (based
on the annually administered May Current Population Survey), Particular growth in union-
ization was evident among lawyers (increasing from 2.7 to 7.6 percent), physicians (from 3.6
to 9.0 percent), and psychologists (from 8.8 to 18.0 percent). See Kokkelenberg & Sockell,
Union Membership in the United States, 1973 -1981, 38 !Nous. & LAB. REL. REV. 497, 505, 506,
522 (1985).
"See, e.g., Anderson & Fettille, The Existence and Effectiveness of Labor-Management
Committees (1981) (unpublished paper presented at the Thirty Fourth Annual Meeting of
the Industrial Relations Research Association); U.S. DEPARTMEN'r of LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW
AND -rift FuTum( or LABOR MANAGEMENT COOPERATIoN (1986). A recent study has found
that over 40 percent or nonunion enterprises in 1987 had an employee involvement plan in
1987, compared to only 7 percent of nonunion companies in 1950. Furthermore, that
percentage tripled in just the eight-year time period from 1980 to 1987. See Ichniowski,
Delaney & Lewin, The New Human Resource Management in U.S. Workplaces: is it Really
Ncw and is it only Nonunion? (August 25, 1988) (unpublished paper presented at the First
Industrial Relations Congress of the Americas, Quebec City). As discussed supra note 10,
these plans can exist in a variety of forms.
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begin to take on some of the traditional attributes or job functions
of supervisors and/or professionals and managers. 38 Indeed, for
these reasons, some scholars have considered the possibility that
employees who participate in such plans may forfeit their "em-
ployee" status, rendering them ineligible for coverage by the
NLRA. 3 '
Collectively, these trends may further challenge the usefulness
of current occupational distinctions thai perhaps never served as
bright lines separating classes of workers from one another. At
perhaps the most superficial level, these trends suggest that some
existing classifications may become relatively anachronistic identi-
fiers of segments of the workforce. Because of the increasing pro-
fessionalization of the workforce, coupled with the growing use of
professional titles for essentially nonprofessional work, and the in-
creasing number of post-secondary educational degrees obtained
by the working population overall,'") it is not clear how many work-
ers will be determined to fall within the Act's definition of employee,
and yet be a nonprofessional. This result would suggest that either
section 2(3), defining employees, or section 2(12), defining profes-
sional employees, would become less necessary, if not meaningless
altogether. Of course, this seemingly semantic problem might be
overcome by eliminating section 2(12) altogether.'"
But more important than this semantic problem is the possi-
bility that large classes of employees, once eligible for coverage by
the NLRA, may now be excluded from the Act's protections. The
extent to which this will occur will depend upon how many profes-
sionals will be treated as managers, as were faculty members in
i8 Angel, supra note 25, at 387. Interestingly, such "progressive" policies are adopted
with the purpose of reducing the distinction among managers and nonmanagers. E.g., Lawler
& Mohrman, Unions and the New Management I AcAn. Mena. EXECUTIVE 293 (1987). That
such policies may then result in the subsequent exclusion of employees from the Act may be
an unintended benefit to some employers.
"See e.g., Note, Collective Bargaining os an industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial
Revision of Sation 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 1-{ARV. L. REV. 1662, 1672
(1983). Considering that supervisory status is applied in a disjunctive fashion with respect to
job it is easy to conceive of nonmanagerial employees meeting the threshold of
supervisory status under an employee participation plan. But for a different view, see Kohler,
supra note 24, at 541).
-1 " For data on the growing proportions of the population receiving advanced educational
degrees, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 164 (1985).
41 s uch a
 solution would also require the elimination of the portion of' § 9(b)(1) that
relates to professional employees. For the text of § 9(b)(1), see supra note 21. In any case,
these occupational mends call into question the wisdom of granting special privileges to
professional employees, once in a small minority. Ironically, the persistence of these trends
may suggest that the right nut to be included in bargaining units with professionals be given
to nonprofessionals.
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Yeshiva,42 and how many blue collar workers will be treated as su-
pervisors or managers. In the face of these trends, rigid applications
of supervisory and managerial exclusions may dramatically reduce
the Act's coverage below the 56 percent of the labor force estimated
to be covered in 1951." At a minimum, these trends suggest that
the distinctions, definitions, and approaches to classifying workers
as covered or excluded may be out of step with societal forces.
Alternatively, these increasing exclusions may mean that we see
unionization as inappropriate for the contemporary worker in gen-
eral.'"
B. Independent Contractors
Like supervisors, independent contractors are expressly ex-
cluded from the definition of "employee" included in the NLRA. 45
Congress enacted this exclusion as part of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments of 1947, in the wake of extensive controversy about how to
determine whether or not an individual is, in effect, self-employed,
and is therefore ineligible for the Act's coverage. 46 But like the
distinctions among employee classifications discussed above, the line
between independent contractor and "employee" is not a bright
one.47 Perhaps unlike these other distinctions, however, the confu-
sion over who is an independent contractor is generated by incon-
sistencies in the explicit tests used to distinguish them. On the one
hand, standard principles of the law of agency (viz., "right of control
factors," such as an individual's role in determining how the work
may be done and the degree of supervision exercised over him or
12 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
4"
	
Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees Under the TO-Hartley Act, 4 INnus, & Lisa.
REv. 556, 557 (1951).
H Of course, exclusion from the Act's coverage does not mean that workers arc prohib-
ited from unionizing. Many scholars, however, believe that coverage by the NLRA, or an
analogous statute, is a necessary condition for becoming unionized. E.g., Dale & Raimon,
Management Unionism and Public Policy on the Railroad and Airlines,11 INnus. & LAB. REL.. REV.
551 (1958); Levinson, Foremen's Unions and the Law, I Lats. 535, 538 (1950); Lewin,
Representatives of Their Own Choosing: Practical Considerations in the Selection of Bargaining
Representatives for Seasonal Farmworkers, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 732, 733 (1976).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). Fur the text of § 2(3), see supra note 13.
46 In 1944, the Supreme Court decided a most controversial case in this area. In NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 132 (1994) the Supreme Court held that news
vendors were employees under the Act. Congress, in effect, expressed its disapproval of this
holding by enacting the explicit independent contractor exception to § 2(3).
' 7 That the application of independent contractor status is either unclear or even incon-
sistent is suggested by Rosenthal's unwillingness to include them in his estimates of the
number of individuals excluded from the NLRA's protection. See Rosenthal, supra note 43,
at 566.
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her), supposedly mandated by Congress in 1947, might be usec1. 18
On the other hand, the central inquiry into determining indepen-
dent contractor status might be whether or not the individual in
question is subject to the bargaining power inequality or mischief
that the Act was intended to correct (viz., "mischief-remedy factors,"
such as the ability to make a profit, having a saleable interest in the
business, or working solely for one employer). 49 Although there is
much debate over which test is or should be used, 5° even despite
Congress's explicit preference for the "right of control test," ele-
ments of both tests often enter the decisionmaking in application. 5 '
This probably explains why it is difficult to be sure who is an
independent contractor, and why, at least in part, there is extensive
speculation about the status of fishermen, taxicab drivers, and news-
paper employees, among others. 52
Although these problems in the identification of independent
contractors have persisted for many years,53
 current developments
are likely to place new strains on how independent contractors are
identified. First, in order to avoid unionization, a number of firms
appear to be restructuring or structuring relationships with em-
ployees (e.g., leasing equipment) in an attempt to ensure that their
employees will be viewed as independent contractors.'"
Second, technological as well as social developments have cre-
ated both the demand for and supply of telecommuters. That is,
there has been a tremendous growth in the employment of inclivid-
48
 That the purpose of the Taft-Hartley amendment regarding independent contractors
was to have labor tribunals rely on agency principles to identify independent. contractors was
noted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. United his. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
" This test was purportedly used by the NLRB prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments
in 1947. For all excellent history of the application of independent contractor status, see
Motomura, Employees and Independent Contractors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 278, 279, 284 (1977),
50 See, e.g., Jacobs, Are "Independent Contractors" Really Independent?, 5 LAB. Li. 345, 349—
50 (1954).
" See Motomura, supra note 49, at 306.
52 See, e.g., Denbo, Thfi-Hartley Act and Newspaper Publishers, 13 LAB. L.J. 709 (1962);
Grady, Collective Bargaining Units in the Transportation Industry, 29 LAB. L.J. 118 (1978);
Randall, Labor Agreements in the West Coast Fishing Industry: Restraint of Trade or Basis of Industrial
Stability?, 3 brims, & LAB. REL. REV. 514 (1950).
88
 Indeed, the majority of articles on independent contractor status were written before
1965. E.g., Denbo, supra note 52; Hoffman, We Need a Definition of "Independent Contractors,"
LAB. L.J. 684 (1950); Jacobs, .supra note 50; Parker, Are Fishermen Employees?, 1 LAB, LT
1001 (1950); Randall, suprrt note 52.
" See Grady, supra note 52, at 123. For an interesting study of this practice in the taxicab
industry, see E.L. Gale, Unionism, Leasing, Litigation and Regulation in the Chicago Taxicab
Industry: An Historical Inquiry (1981) (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Illinois,
Urbana).
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uals who are able to work at home using computer terminals due
to expanding telecommunication capabilities and networks. 55 The
status of the growing population of these workers as independent
contractors has yet to be determined, although a reasonable case
can be made that they would qualify as independent contractors.
Such a finding would be likely if a labor tribunal relied upon right
of control factors to determine the status of these individuals, and
they owned or rented their computer terminals. 5" Moreover, many
of these new independent contractors, who might otherwise have
been forced to work outside of the home, would likely have been
eligible for the NLRA's protection had they worked on the employ-
er's premises.57 What this means is that there is yet another Factor
that may lead to even further exclusions from the NLRA. 58
In sum, the challenges to the meaningfulness of the NLRA
discussed in this section have revealed the problem of the declining
population eligible to receive the Act's protections. In the next part
" Precise estimates of the size and growth of the telecummuter population arc not
available. Instead, estimates of growth are based primarily on impressionistic or anecdotal
evidence. See, e.g., Bellace, Changing Employment Relationships: Labor Law at the Crossroads, in
SELECTED PAPERS 01,"EllE AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW ASSOCIATION DISTRICT 1, 100 (1986);
Survey of San Francisco Area Employers Shows Wide Use of New Work Time Option, 237 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Dec. 10, 1986). Based on data from the October 1984 Current Population
Survey, administered to 00,000 households, approximately three million people use a aim-
purer at home for job-related" reasons, These data are cited and discussed in Census Bureau
Report Released on Computer Use Trends, 5 TELEcommuTiNc. Rrv. 14 (1988) [hereinafter, Census
Bureau Report]. It is of course, impossible to determine how many I/I these individuals work
at home exclusively and work for a company.
5" Of' course, the degree of supervision exercised over these individuals would also matter.
Technological capabilities might enable sophisticated forms of supervisiod i through some
central system of monitoring key strokes, errors and so forth.
57 This argument is based in large part on anecdotal evidence about the kind of work
typically performed by nonmanager telecommuters, such as the processing of insurance
claims. For a description of this work, see Cliarnot„'ilatemenits During Symposium on Workstations
in the Home, 224 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D- I (Nov. 18, 1983). The opportunity to engage ha
industrial homework has probably attracted a segment of the population into the labor force
(viz., individuals who would not work if they had to leave their homes, or to meet 0 fixed
work schedule). The status of these individuals, however, is irrelevant to the argument. that
applications of independent contractor status will result in l'itrtlier exclusions from the Act,
because those individuals would nut have been working a unionized in the absence of the
opportunity to work at home.
" The significance of the status of these workers can be debated, however. Bellace has
argued that the question of whether or n ot telecommuters are independent contractors may
be an academic one only. Even if such workers arc independent contractors, they are unlikely
to unionize given that they are "isolated from co-workers." See Bellace, supra note 55, at. 114,
115, Yet, whether or not this argument has validity will depend upon whether new union
organizing strategies are developed to accimunodate telecommuters. For example, it is plau-
sible that the actual isolation of such workers can be overcome by telecommunications
networks, whereby workers can reach each other at their terniinals. This point is discussed
in section V of the text.
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of the paper, I turn to the legality of forums through which indi-
viduals potentially covered by the Act may seek to influence their
worklives and organizations.
II. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PLANS: INNOVATIVE PRACTICES OR
UNION AVOIDANCE TACTICS?
Another problem that has challenged and will continue to chal-
lenge the existing state of labor law is the legal status of employee
participation programs. Whether the plans appear in the form of
quality circles, Scanlon or Rucker plans, or other programs involv-
ing employees in some aspect(s) of organizational decisionmaking,
scholars generally assume that the number of programs in existence
or at the experimental phase has grown in recent years. 59
In general, the reasons that can be offered for increasing in-
terest in and demand for such programs include: (1) employers
have sought to increase morale and productivity in response to
concerns about the failure of productivity to grow substantially in
the United States and the growth of international competition;"
(2) increasing educational attainment of the workforce has been
accompanied by increasing desires, on the part of employees, for
input into organizational decisionmaking — desires to which em-
ployers have responded;"' (3) following in the human relations
tradition, and spurred by the interest in Japanese management
styles, employers have instituted programs because they believe that
participation programs are "good" for employees; 62 and (4) increas-
ingly, employers have used such programs unlawfully to avoid
unionization or weaken incumbent unions.° Because it is often
5 ' E.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT COOPERATION (1986); Sclunidman & Keller, Employee Participation Plans as Section
8(a)(2) Violations, 35 LAB. L.J. 772 (1984).
6" See, e.g., Beaver, Are Worker Participation Plans Labor Organizations within the Meaning of
Section 2(5): A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 36 LAB. L.J. 226 (1985); Behrens & Sollenberger,
The National Labor Relations Act: A Potential Legal Constraint Upon Quality Circles and Other
Employer-Sponsored Committees, 34 LAB. L.J. 776 (1983).
"' See, e.g., I-logic:I', Employee Involvement and NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co.: The Developing
Interpretation of Section 8(a)(2), 35 LAB. L.J. 21 (1984).
62 Much of the literature "selling" the idea of employee participation programs manifests
the implicit value judgment that all employees should want such programs because they are
"good" for them. E.g., C. ARGYRIS, PERSONALITV AND ORGANIZATION (1957); D. MACGREGOR,
TuE HUMAN SIDE OE TILE ENTERPRISE (1960). For a discussion of the underlying values in
this literature, see Strauss, Some Notes on Power Equalization, in TILE SOCIAL. SCIENCE. OF
ORGANIZATION at 47-53 (Leavitt ed. 1963).
See, e.g., Sellmidman & Keller, supra note 59, at 772.
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unclear which of these different motivations underlies the adoption
of any given participation plan, employee participation programs
place labor tribunals in a quandary. Perhaps in no other area of the
law is it more difficult to chart a line between enlightened personnel
policies or legitimate efforts to improve or enhance employee mor-
ale and performance, and unlawful union avoidance or union cir-
cumvention tactics. Moreover, the multiple reasons for a participa-
tion program may also explain why interpretations of the NLRA
have been generally and historically unfavorable to employee par-
ticipation programs existing outside of a union model. 64 By en-
couraging all forms of participation to be achieved through the
union, the question of whether or not a program was instituted to
avoid or circumvent the union is eliminated.
To understand the legal problems engendered by a participa-
tion program, it is important to recognize not only that such pro-
grams derive from multiple potential motivations, but also that any
employee participation plan potentially violates section (8)(a)(5) or
(8)(a)(2) of the NLRA."5 In organized settings, a participation plan
that exists outside of union control can unlawfully challenge the
union's exclusivity. Thus, an employer's attempt to deal with em-
ployees through that plan will constitute a failure by the employer
to bargain in good faith,"" provided that the plan is viewed as a
labor organization under section 2(5) of the Act. 67 In unorganized
" Much commentary has focused on the legal treatment of participation plans and die
apparent or potential legal bias against such plans in the nonunion environment. E.g.,
Jackson, An Alternative to Unionization and the Wholly Unorganized Shop: A Legal Basis for
Sanctioning Joint Employer-Employee Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 809, 818 (1977); Sockell, The Legality of Employee Participation Programs in Unionized
Firms, 37 INDUS. & LAB. Rio,. REv. 541 (1984); Note, supra note 39; see also supra notes 59-
61 and the articles cited therein. Jackson provides a detailed review of the rationales that
seem to underlie the Board's unwillingness to sanction Many types of nonunion employee
participation plans. These rationales include the protection of employee free choice, protec-
tion of boon fide unions as vehicles of employee participation, and ensuring arms length or
vigorous bargaining or representation. See Jackson, supra, at 818-23.
"-% Section 8(a)(5) establishes that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse
to bargain with representatives of his employees . ..." See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). In other
words, potentially, it would be unlawful for an employer to circumvent the certified bargain-
ing agent by dealing with employees in another forum. Section H(a)(2) establishes that it is
an unl'air labor practice for all employer 'to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it ."
See id. § 158(a)(2).
The duty to bargain in good faith is described in § 8(d) of the NLRA, and an employer's
['allure to bargain in good faith is established as an unfair labor practice in § 8(a)(5).
" Section 2(5) of the Act defines a "labor organization" as
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation com-
mittee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose,
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settings, a participation plan can also violate the law if it meets the
definition of a labor organization and an employer unlawfully sup-
ports or dominates it. Because the vast majority of such plans in
unorganized settings were initiated and implemented by manage-
ment, unlawful support or domination, prohibited by section 8(a)(2)
of the Act, can be relatively easily established.68
Recent case law, however, suggests that some labor tribunals
are now according legality to employee participation plans in un-
organized settings more liberally than in the past. Specifically, sev-
eral circuit courts have found employee committees to be lawful
either by more narrow applications of labor organization status or
by restricting the circumstances under which unlawful employer
support or domination will be found.69 Whether or not these ap-
proaches to assessing the legality of participation programs will
stand the test of future litigation is less certain than the fact that
they are likely to invite litigation from unions and continued con-
troversy among legal scholars. 7° Beyond this fact, and the fact that
the forces giving rise to participation plans will likely continue to
do so, there are several specific sources of controversy and litigation
likely to be associated with participation plans. 71
First, and perhaps most significant, is that, by taking a sanguine
view of employee participation programs and according them legal
status, labor tribunals are effectively inviting antiunion employers
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982). A detailed analysis of the legal status of participation plans outside
of union control (in unionized firms) is presented in Sockeil, supra note 64.
Virtually all commentaries on the legal status of participation plans include a discussion
of this point. See supra notes 59-61,63-64, and authorities cited therein. Also see the statutory
language of § 8(a)(2), presented supra note 65.
69 See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982). This case departs
substantially from the approach taken by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,
360 U.S. 203 (1959), and does not necessarily accord with approaches taken by other circuits.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971). The Streamway decision has
been roundly criticized by many legal scholars. See, e.g., Beaver, supra note 60, at 236-37;
Schmidman & Keller, supra note 59, at 776-78; Note, supra note 39.
7" See NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. North-
eastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625
(9th Cir. 1974). For an earlier case that has, in effect, provided the justifications for these
holdings, see Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). For an
insightful discussion of several of these cases and the disagreement among circuits which
have decided such cases, see flogler, supra note 61; Note, supra note 39.
71 In recent times, employee participation plans seem to have generated more legal
commentary than litigation. Perhaps one possible explanation for this is that where cooper-
ation truly exists, that is, employees have real input into organizational decisionmaking
(because the participation plan is effective), there is less likely to be interest in union orga-
nizing or attempts to organize workers.
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to experiment with plans that can dissipate support for a union.
The dramatic growth in employer resistance to union organizing
and employer unfair labor practices is Well-documented." Some
antiunion employers may view employee participation plans as one
weapon in their arsenal of "sophisticated personnel policies which
undermine the impetus for worker collectivization." 73 In so doing,
they will- likely implement such programs and attempt to test labor
tribunals' conceptions of the line between "enlightened" personnel
policies and unlawful avoidance and circumvention techniques. In
response to the use of these programs, organizing and incumbent
unions will likely be forced to file unfair labor practice charges.
Second, and on a related note, employers seeking to disqualify
employee participation programs as labor organizations may have
received, in effect, some recent advice from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in NLRB v. North Shore University
Hospital. 74 That case involved the refusal of a hospital to bargain
with a certified representative of nonsupervisory employees. The
Second Circuit held that the Board should consider the extent of
supervisory influence in the governance and affairs of the bargain-
ing representative in deciding whether that representative qualifies
as a labor organization. Because sufficient influence can disqualify
the bargaining representative, antiunion employers may be able to
ensure that a participation program does not qualify as a labor
organization by including supervisors in the forum and by giving
supervisors significant roles in the program's operation. If, indeed,
North Shore is applied in this fashion, and labor organization status
can be avoided, then there would be no basis for findings of unlaw-
ful domination (in unorganized settings) or unlawful circumvention
of the certified bargaining agent (in organized settings)." In this
See, e.g., Bernstein, Uninn Busting: From Benign Neglect to Malignant Growth, 14 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 1 (1980); Craver, The Vitality of the American Law Movement in the Twenty-144M
Century, 1983 U. ILL L. Riv. 633 (1983); Farber, The Recent Decline of Unionization in the
United Stales, 238 SCIENCE 915 (1987); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Haim L. REV. 1769,1781 (1983).
73 Craver, supra note 72, at 035-36.
" 724 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1983). The precise question at issue in that case was whi..:InQr
supervisory influence over the operation and governance of' a multipurpose professional
organization would disqualify that organization as a representative of rank and file employees
for the purposes of collective bargaining. Id. in 270. The court concluded that, although
professional organizations arc n o t automatically disqualified, the nurses' association could he
disqualified because of the role and influence of supervisors. M. at 273.
75 The foregoing analyses are not meant to imply 111;i( participation programs are only
used by antiunion employers who seek to avoid or circumvent unions. Instead, it is argued
that the increasingly liberal treatment of such plans in terms of legality will encourage their
adoption, and that participation programs will prove to be an increasingly attractive vehicle
for antiunion employers to use in order to escape collective bargaining.
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sense, current law may not only be "inviting" the use of participation
programs by antiunion employers, it may also be providing them
with the means to escape legal sanction.
Third, there appears to be disagreement among circuit courts
and between the NLRB and some circuits on how labor organization
status should be accorded and what constitutes unlawful domina-
tion. 76 Historically, according to commentators, the Board has ap-
plied section 8(a)(2) more strictly than some courts. 77 These incon-
sistencies will continue to invite litigation of the legality of employee
participation plans.
Finally, tension, if not litigation, on this issue will likely continue
as long as both scholars and labor tribunals insist that the purpose
of the Act is to foster labor-management cooperation, while others
insist that the Act is designed to maintain an adversarial system of
labor relations. 78 Both sides in this debate seem poised to greet
decisions consistent with their view with applause and those incon-
sistent with harsh criticism. What these "advocates" seem to forget,
however, is that neither cooperation nor adversarial relations are
"ends" promoted by the Act. Rather, they are two means to give
workers a say over their work lives, or to achieve industrial democ-
racy — one of the many, though often conflicting, purposes of the
NLRA. 79 And when the means no longer promote this end, legal
prohibitions and prescriptions need to be fashioned. In terms of
employee participation plans, this amounts to a careful considera-
70 See, e.g., Behrens & Sollenberger, supra note 60, at 777-79; Note, supra note 39, at
1662-71; see also cases cited supra notes 69-70.
" See, e.g., Vogler, supra note 61, at 25; Jackson, supra note 64, at 812-18.
7a e.g., Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955)
(discussed in Note, supra note 39, at 1667) with, e.g., Kohler, supra note 24. The Chicago
Rawhide case involved the legality of au employee-initiated shop committee, designed to deal
with grievances and other employment matters. The employer permitted elections to be held
on company property, notices to be posted on bulletin boards, shop-committee business t4)
be transacted on company premises, and some grievance processing to be conducted on
company time, among other things. In the Seventh Circuit's view, unlike the NLRB's. those
acts constituted "laudable cooperation with the employees' organization," rather than unlaw-
ful support. See Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 170. Thus, by being unwilling to permit the
NLRB to destroy "a happy and cooperative employer-employee relationship," id., the Seventh
Circuit may not only have viewed cooperation as consistent with the NLRA and collective
bargaining, but it may also have viewed cooperation as an employee relations goal. Kohler
argues, by contrast, that the norms that underlie cooperative or human relationist models or
employee relations are "antipodal to those that underlie the collective bargaining model."
Kohler, supra note 24, at 517. He believes that collective bargaining requires the structural
independence of the means through which labor may influence management decisionmaking
— a condition violated by participative management or cooperative schemes. See Kohler,
supra note 24, at 543-45 (discussing Chicago Rawhide).
79 For an insightful discussion of the contradictory purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act, see Gross, supra note 3.
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Lion of where the line between enlightened personnel policies and
union avoidance or circumvention tactics should be drawn or re-
drawn.
In short, the growing use of participation plans and increasing
employer resistance to unions, as well as an uncertain or changing
policy on the legal status of participation plans, are likely to pose
an important challenge for labor law. Specifically, that challenge will
entail a reconsideration of how best to achieve worker say in the
work place or where to draw the line between lawful and unlawful
forums for that input.
III. THE SCOPE OF MANDATORY BARGAINING: THE UNION'S ROLE
IN AN ENTERPRISE
The duty to bargain and the scope of that mandatory bargain-
ing obligation lie at the heart of organized labor's collective bar-
gaining entitlements. Although parties are allowed to "cooperate"
in making decisions on a voluntary basis, they are compelled by law
(at each other's request) to negotiate or engage in joint decision-
making over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment."8" Without that legal compulsion, many unions, even
those obtaining certification, would probably find it difficult to bring
employers to the negotiating table and to obtain concessions on
issues important to their constituents!" Indeed, this may explain,
in part, why the NLRA was needed to foster the use of collective
bargaining and why coverage by the Act is viewed by many to be
necessary for successful organization and effective representation. 82
8" See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1974). Failure to bargain about those subjects is established as
an unfair labor practice in § 8(13)(3) and § 8(a)(5).
se 01 course, the law is not the only source of a union's bargaining power or its ability
to get management to concede on its terms. For this definition of bargaining power and an
insightful discussion of the antecedents and consequences of bargaining power, see N. CHAM-
BERLAIN & J. KUHN, CHLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1986). It is, however, reasonable to expect that
unions weaker in sources of bargaining power other than the law would be more likely
disadvantaged by the absence of a bargaining obligation. See, e.g., Stickel] & Delaney, Who
Wins If Fewer Items Are Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining?, 11 LAB. STI.M. J. (1986).
" For a discussion of this point in the context of agricultural laborers, see Lewin, supra
note 44, at 734 n.4. For a review of other articles in which this argument is [mute, see Delaney,
Lewin, & Sockell, supra note 19, at 48. To be sure, coverage by the Act is not the sine qua
non for successful organizing campaigns, as many individuals, viewed as employees for the
purposes of the Act, have "chosen" not to become unionized. Furthermore, specific features
of the NLRA and interpretations of the Act would also seem to affect the success of organizing
campaigns. For example, bargaining unit decisions, as well as rules governing how and where
organizing campaigns may be conducted (that is, restrictions on propaganda and solicitation),
may well affect election outcomes. See, e.g., Delaney & Sockell, Hospital Unit Determinations
and the Preservation of Employee Free Choice, 39 LAB. L.J. 259 (1988); Dickens, The Effect of
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Beyond contributing to the existence and effectiveness of a
union in a firm, however, the subjects over which the mandatory
bargaining obligations extend are critical to establishing what role
the union serves in an enterprise." This is because lawful bargaining
subjects that fall outside of the statutory phrase "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment," referred to as permis-
sive subjects, are treated differently from mandatory subjects. Not
only does the bargaining obligation fail to encompass permissive
issues, parties are prohibited from pursuing permissive issues to
impasse (that is, to strike or to lockout workers). 84 Primarily for this
reason, many scholars argue that effective or meaningful negotia-
tions over permissive issues are less likely; 85
 indeed, research in the
private sector and studies on analogous distinctions in the public
sector has provided some empirical support for this argument.R'
Because the bargaining obligation and the right to use economic
muscle extend to only mandatory subjects, decisions about what is
mandatory limit the range of issues over which management is
compelled to negotiate with unions. Thus, such decisions may ulti-
mately influence what a union does in an enterprise.
In essence, therefore, because the breadth of the legally-fos-
tered and guaranteed union access to management shapes the scope
Company Campaigns. on Certification Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. RE:V. 560 (1983). Controls on the organizing process and restrictions on tactics that may
be used to resist unionization, among other things, also play a central role in the attempts to
become unionized.
83
 An extensive discussion of this point can be found in Sockell, Towards a Theory of the
Union's Role in an Enterpthe, I ADVANCES INDUS. & LAB. REL. 221, 225-34 (1983).
84 The Supreme Court. acknowledged the distinction between mandatory and permissive
subjects, and established this difference between mandatory and permissive items, in NLRB
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). In addition, unilateral changes in manda-
tory, but not permissive items are prohibited (unless an impasse is reached). See NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 KU 472, 481 (5th Cir. 1963).
85 See, e.g., Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. Rev. 248,
272 (1964); Sr. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, 4 ABA SEC.
LAB. REL. L. PtioE. 11 (1973); Note, The Impact of the Borg-Warner Case on Collective Bargaining,
43 MINN. L. REv. 1225, 1235-36 (1959).
See Delaney, The Effects of Impasses on Teacher Bargaining Outcomes (1983) (un-
published dissertation, University of Illinois); Delaney, Sockell & Bruckner, Bargaining Effects
of the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction, 27 INDUS. REL. 21 (1988); Woodbury, The Scope of
Bargaining and Bargaining Outcomes in the Public Schools, 38 !Nn's. & LAB. REL. REv. 195
(1985). Moreover, this evidence notwithstanding, there are those scholars who are skeptical
about the impact of the mandatory-permissive distinction. Some scholars argue that permis-
sive status may Out serve as a barrier to effective negotiations if a party engages in bogus
insistence on a mandatory item to gain concessions on a permissive one. See, e.g. ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 111-35 (1983); Dunlop, Public Regulation
of Collective Bargaining, ABA SEC. LAB. REL. 1. Ptioc. 47 (1953); Weisberger, 1977 Wts. L.
REV. 685, 692-93.
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of union activity or the sphere of union influence, a more narrow
interpretation of the issues embraced by "wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment" will likely lead td a more limited
union role in enterprise decisionmaking. A broader interpretation,
by contrast, may facilitate an expanded union presence in enterprise
affairs. Furthermore, the breadth of the bargaining obligation not-
withstanding, the type and nature of issues classified as mandatory
will affect the function a union serves in the firm. For this reason,
a labor tribunal's construction of the statutory phrase, "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" would seem
to reflect, at least in part, its underlying view of the appropriate
place and role of the union. Moreover, regardless of the precise
rationale offered for a given interpretation of the statutory bar-
gaining obligation, such as notions of how best to advance efficiency
within a bargaining framework, employers' private property rights,
conceptions of what workers are or should be interested in, custom
and purposes of the Act, or some combination of these rationales, 87
such determinations may inevitably rest on labor tribunals' concep-
tions of what belongs on the bargaining table or what decisions
affecting the firm are appropriately resolved with union input.
Given these implications and consequences, it is no wonder that
the scope of mandatory bargaining, or the application of the man-
datory-permissive distinction, has generated almost continuous
scholarly debate and legal challenge. 88 This controversy has been
A detailed discussion of the rationales offered by the Board and the courts for inter-
pretation of the scope of the mandatory bargaining obligation may be found in Stickel), The
Scope of the Mandatory Bargaining Obligation: A Critique and a Proposal, 40 INDus. & LAB.
REv. 19, 24-27 (1986); see also J.B. A'CLESON, supra note 86.
Indeed, even though it has been three decades since Borg-Warner was decided, there
seems to be neither a full-off among commentaries published that deal with the mandatory-
permissive distinction nor a time period in which legal commentators neglected to consider
the distinction. For it subset of articles dealing primarily or exclusively with the distinction,
which span the time period since Borg-Warner was decided, see Wollett, The Borg-Warner
Case and the Role of the NLRB in the Bargaining Process, 12 N.Y.U. ANN. CONe. ON LAB. Punt.
39 (1959); Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961); 11.
WELLINGTON, LABOR AND 'ME LEGAL. PRocasa 63-90 (1963); Note, The Dew/opine/a of the
Fibreboard Doctrine: The Duty to Bargain Over Economically Motivated Subcontracting Decisions, 33
U. Cut. L. REV. 315 (1966); Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work The
Search for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 CoLum. L. Rev. 803 (1971);
Note, Application of the Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy to the Duty-to-Bargain and Unilateral
Action: A Review and Reevaluation, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 918 (1974); Morris, The Role of the
NLRB and the Court in the Collective Bargaining Process: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom and
Unconventional Remedies, 30 VAND. L. Rr.v. 661 (1977); Note, Duty to Bargain about Termination
of Operations: Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 92 Halm L. 14;v. 768 (1979) [hereinafter
Note, Duty to Bargain about Termination of Operations]; Gacek, The Employer's Duty to Bargain on
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fueled not only by differing, underlying conceptions of unions'
place in society, but also by the substantial inconsistency among
labor tribunals' interpretations of what is within the scope of sta-
tutory bargaining.89
 But beyond the debate have been some recent,
interrelated developments likely to challenge current definitions of
the scope of bargaining.
First, recently, an array of items critical to labor, such as partial
plant closures," relocations,9 ' and even forms of subcontracting
once held to be mandatory," classified inconsistently in the past,
Termination of Unit Work, 32 LAB. L.J. 659 (1981); Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner
to First National Maintenance: 'rhe Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982);
Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance,
5 Indus. Rio,. L.J. 402 (1983); Susser, NLRB Restricts Mandator). Bargaining Over Managerial
Changes, 35 LAB, L.J. 415 (1984); George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work
Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667 (1986). For -additional articles, see supra notes 81–
83,
' 19 Discussions of these inconsistencies may be found in Gacek, supra note 88; Harper,
supra note 88, at 1449; Oldham, Organized Labor, the Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71
Mien. L. REV. 935, 936 (1973); Sockell, supra note 87, at 22; Note, Duty to Bargain about
Termination of Operations, supra note 88.
9° First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (FNM). In FNM, the
Supreme Court found that a partial plant closure (the termination of a maintenance contract)
was a permissive subject of bargaining, because it turned on a change in the nature and
direction of the business, not on labor costs. It noted that the harm likely to be clone to an
employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether or not to shut down parts of its
business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained
through the union's participation in making the decision." Id. at 686. In so doing, the Court
changed the balancing test front what had been suggested and applied by some previous
courts and. boards; namely, instead of balancing employees' and employer's interests or harm
to reach decisions on the status of partial plant closures or analogous forms of subcontracting,
the Court balanced the benefits to the employer of union input versus the costs of obtaining
that input — the union/employee's side of the equation was neglected. For a discussion of
earlier approaches to determining the status of issues, see, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), discussed infra note 92; Gacek, supra note 88; Harper,
supra note 88; see also FNM, 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
As discussed above, the critical factor, according to the Court, and in the tests used by
labor tribunals in cases subsequent to FNM, has been the "essence of the decision itself" —
that is, whether or not the decision hinged on labor costs or general profitability concerns.
FNM, 452 U.S. at 686; see also Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 673 F.2d 483 (l lilt Cir. 1982);
NLRB v. Gibraltar Indus., 653 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1981); Penntech Papers, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B.
264 (1982), enforced, 706 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983). Because all such decisions may be couched
in terms of profitability, rather than labor costs per se, partial plant closures are now virtually
always permissive items. For a discussion of this point, see Gould, The Supreme Court's Labor
and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. Cow. L. REV. 1, 16
(1981); Sockell, supra note 87, at 22-23; Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 VAI.F. L.J. 1509, 1573 (1981).
91 E.g., Milwaukee Spring Div. (I I), 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984). In that case, the Board
held that an economically-motivated, unilateral decision to relocate assembly operations,
made during the term of' the agreement, did not constitute a 8(a)(5) violation because the
decision did not modify a specific term contained in the contract.
yi E.g., Garwood-Detroit Equip., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 113, 114-15 (1985). In Garwood, the
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has been virtually excluded from the bargaining obligation. The
Board's opinion in Otis Elevator Coss may permit other decisions
that involve both management interests in directing the firm and
substantial traditional union interests in preserving bargaining unit
employment also to be classified as permissive."' Such substantial
diminutions of organized labor's bargaining table entitlements are
likely to invite substantial challenge from a labor movement already
troubled by a declining proportion of the labor force unionized, by
increasing losses in certification elections, and by the growing num-
ber of employer unfair labor practices:35
Second, this contraction in the mandatory bargaining obligation
has occurred at a time when there is an important need for flexibility
and innovation in union-management relationships. Indeed, ob-
servers have called for an expanded labor-management agenda to
address problems of international competition and productivity. 96
But the mandatory-permissive distinction may work at cross-pur-
poses with those recommendations, as the bargaining agenda is
biased away from permissive issues (because, in large part, parties
may simply refuse to negotiate about them). 97 if it is true that
NLRB found that subcontracting, which was characterized by the Administrative Law judge
as resulting in the replacement of work normally performed by members of the bargaining
unit, was a permissive subject of bargaining, In so holding, the NLRB relied upon Milwaukee
Spring and Otis Elevator (discussed infra note 93) and held that the essence of the decision
involved in Garwood affected the scope and direction or the enterprise, rendering it robe
permissive. See Garwood, 274 N.L.R.B. at 114. That the Board relied upon Otis Elevator and
Milwaukee Spring is at least curious, if not misguided, in light of the Supreme Court's
longstanding precedent that subcontracting, which involves a mere replacement of bargaining
unit work, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964).
a 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). In Otis, the NLRB held that management's decision to
relocate and consolidate some of its operations was a permissive subject of bargaining. In
reaching that opinion, the NLRB focused on whether the essence of the decision turned
"upon a change in the nature or direction of the business, or turnled on] labor costs." 269
N.L.R.B. at 392, Significantly, though the Board's decision in Otis was based, in substantial
part, on the Supreme Court's holding in First National, the First National Court specifically
stated that its holding did not deal with management decisions other than partial plant
closures. 452 U.S. 666, 686 n.22 (1981).
9' In effect, all an employer needs to demonstrate to ensure that such decisions are
deemed permissive is that its decision was not motivated primarily by labor costs.
95 Unions once won a majority of certification elections, though today they lose a majority
of them. For data on trends in union membership and election victories as well as explanations
Ow these trends, see R.B. FREEMAN & J.L. MEDOFF, [Kr DO UNIONS DO? 221-45 (1984);
Farber, supra note 72; Fiorito & Maranto, The Contemporary Decline in Union Strength, 5
CONTEMP. POL'Y !stinks 12 (1987); Weiler, supra note 72.
96 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE Ftyrutu.; OF LABOR MANAGEMENT COOPER-
ATION (1986).
"7 See, e.g., WELLING:roN, supra note 88; Fleming, supra note 88, at 996; Millen., supra
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bargaining over permissive items is likely (or often) ineffective, then
the narrowing of the mandatory bargaining obligation simply in-
creases the potential rigidities in the bargaining process introduced
by the mandatory-permissive distinction. 9  Specifically, as a number
of scholars have suggested, the distinction itself may encourage
undesirable uniformity among collective agreements, as the distinc-
tion itself is not necessarily responsive to changing times, economic
developments, and industry or regional idiosyncracies.99 The costs
that such rigidities pose are more salient when the mandatory bar-
gaining obligation shrinks at precisely the time when economic
circumstances require innovation in collective bargaining relation-
ships.
Moreover, because of the economic crisis posed by international
competition facing many heavily unionized industries (such as the
automobile and steel industry), the instability in labor relations
caused by labor tribunals' inconsistent interpretations of the bar-
gaining obligation would seem to be particularly costly today. As
such, this decisional inconsistency may also prove to be a powerful
force propelling a reassessment of the scope of bargaining.
Finally, the scope of bargaining seems to be founded on a
narrow, though traditional, view of workers' interests and compe-
tencies. That view, suggested by labor tribunals' holdings that cer-
tain subjects of bargaining should not be within the compulsory
bargaining obligation, seems to be based on the assumption that
workers are or should be interested primarily (if not exclusively) in
issues that have a direct and immediate impact on the terms of their
employment. 100 As well, such cases suggest that workers would likely
note 88, at 42; Note, Bargaining on Non mandatory Topics Constitutes Refusal to Bargain, I I STAN.
L. REv. 188, 190 (1958); studies cited supra note 85. In an empirical study of bargaining
behaviors, based on a laboratory experiment, parties were found to spend less time negoti-
ating about an issue classified as permissive than when that same issue was classified as
mandatory. Permissive status was also found to reduce concessionary behavior. See Delaney,
Sockell, & Bruckner, supra note 86.
' 8 For a discussion of this point and a review of studies in which the mandatory-permissive
distinction is indicted on these grounds, see Sockell, supra note 87, at 28.
" See, e.g., Cox, Law and the Future of Labor Management Relations, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 240,
246 (1953); studies cited supra note 94. Of course, both parties may voluntarily agree to
expand the agenda to realize the benefits of agreements tailored to their own circumstances,
the studies of bargaining issues notwithstanding. For this reason, the distinction hurts parties
that are either misinformed of such benefits or are failing to maximize their joint interests.
See a discussion of this point in Sockell, supra note 87, at 28.
m E.g., Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local 2265 (Mill Floor Coverings, Inc.), 136
N. L.R.B. 769 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1963). Lt that case, the NLRB held that
contributions to an industry promotion fund were not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
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be incompetent to deal with workplace issues outside of their more
"parochial" employment interests." Like approaches in the exclu-
sion area, these views seem to be based on a static notion of the
typical worker's interests as well as clear divisions between employ-
ees' and managers' identities, capabilities, and interests. The poten-
tial folly of these notions was addressed in section 1. Suffice it to
add here that, if the occupational and educational trends discussed
earlier continue, this traditional view of workers' interests and abil-
ities may become inappropriate. Thus, by placing more issues out-
side of the bargaining obligation, workers may fail to have input
into various aspects of organizational functioning in which they have
become interested and have developed competencies." 2 As a result,
pressure for a reconsideration of the appropriateness of a limited
scope of bargaining may also come from workers who demand more
say in their enterprises.
IV. REMEDIES: DECLINING EFFECTIVENESS IN AN AGE OF
INCREASING NEED
Commentators have long criticized the efficacy of remedies for
employer unfair labor practices)" Recently, studies have cited the
Id. at 771. In so holding, the NLRB noted that a compulsory bargaining obligation over the
issue of advertising "would transform bargaining over the compensation, hours and condi-
tions of employment into a debate over policy objectives." Id. For similar holdings implying
that "policies" do not belong on the bargaining table, see Sheet Metal Workers, Local 38, 231
N.L.R.B. 669 (1977), enforced, 575 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1978); Local 264, Laborers, 216 N.L.R.B.
40 (1975). Of course, this narrow view of workers' interests is not a fiction created by labor
tribunals. Instead, it reflects the predominant type of "bread and butter" Unionization no•-
mally associated with the United States labor movement.
1 "' See, e.g., G.M., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1971). In G.M.,
the Board held that the sale of equipment and leasing of property were nol mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Id. In so holding, the Board noted that "decisions such as these, in
which a significant investment or withdrawal of capital will affect the scope and ultimate
direction of the enterprise, are matters essentially financial and managerial in nature." Id.
Further, the Board stated that "[s]uclt managerial decisions ofttimes require secrecy as well
as the freedom to act quickly and decisively. They also involve subject areas as to which the
determinative financial and operational considerations arc likely to be unfamiliar to the
employees and their representatives." Id.
'" 2 See Angel, supra note 25, at 429.
103 See, e.g., Samolf, The Impact of Taft-Hartley Job Discrimination Victories, 4 1Nous. Rcu 77
(1965); Drotning & Lipsky, 'the Effectiveness of Reinstatement as a Public Policy Remedy, 22 INous.
& LAN. REv. 179 (1969); Greer & Martin, Calculative Strategy Decisions During Union
Organization Campaigns, 19 SLOAN MOW. REv. 61 (1978); Weiler, supra note 72, at 1787-95;
Kleiner, Unionism and Employer-Discrimi nation: Analysis of 8(a)(3) Violations, 23 INDUS, REL. 234
(1984). Fur it review of these and other comments on the adequacy of remedies, see Delaney,
Lewin, & Sockell, supra note 19, at 55-57.
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inadequacy of remedies as a major factor contributing to increasing
union losses in certification elections and the declining proportion
of the labor force unionized.'" Although this relationship probably
cannot be established empirically, 105 it appears that today, as per-
haps unlike any other time since the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts
were passed, there are even stronger indications that the adequacy
and timeliness of the remedial process contain serious flaws. The
basis for this argument is set forth below.
Statistics generally reveal that the number of unfair labor prac-
tices has increased significantly." Commentators also generally
agree that the sophistication of employers' union resistance tactics
has increased. 107 In particular, the "rapid and recent" growth of' the
union busting business, consisting of some private consulting firms,
law firms, industrial psychologists, and employer and trade associ-
ations, among other groups,'" 8 as well as the increased reliance on
consultants during organizing campaigns," are used as support for
this argument. Research has shown that the use of consultants,
specifically, is significantly and negatively related to union election
victories."° Moreover, based upon an in-house survey of union
organizers conducted by the AFL-CIO, approximately 70 percent
of 226 elections held between July 1982 and February 1983 were
directed by consultants." In addition, according to those same
organizers, in more than half of such elections there were employer
unfair labor practices,' 12 while 90 percent of election-organizing
attempts were actively resisted by employers, who used captive au-
104 For a review of this and other explanations kir the decline in union membership, sec
studies cited .supra note 95.
105 This is because the arsenal of remedies has remained roughly constant over the entire
period of the decline in unionization.
umi See, e.g., Craver, The NLRA at Fifty: From Youthfid Exuberance to Middle-Aged Complacency,
36 LAB. L.J. 609 (1985); Farber, supra note 72, at 919; Weiler, supra note 72, at 1781.
07 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 72, at 3-4; Craver, supra note 72, at 642.
" Bernstein, supra note 72, at 5-10.
'" C. McDonald, Speech before the Senate Oversight Committee on the Landrum Griffin
Act (Feb. 1984).
i" See Lawler, The Influence of Management Consultants on the Outcome of Union Certification
Elections, 38 !twos. & LAB. REL. Rev. 38 (1989); Lawler & West, Attorneys, Consultants and
Union Avoidance Strategies in Representative Elections, 24 INDUS. Ret.. 406 (1985).
", The AFL-CIO Department of Field Research has recently re-administered a version
of this survey. It is anticipated that the results will be reported in the spring of 1989.
12 Precise estimates of the number of unfair labor practices could not be calculated given
the way the data were reported. What could be ascertained was that 52 percent of the sample
of 226 elections involved employer unfair labor practices other than discharge and 28 percent
involved discriminatory discharges.
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(hence speeches, company letters, and/or supervisory meetings with
employees to state their cases. 13
Yet despite all of these developments, the arsenal of remedies,
arguably deficient in the past, has remained constant, and the em-
ployer's expected costs for breaking the law have not increased to
keep step with the types and frequency of activities in which em-
ployers have engaged. Indeed, if anything, those costs have de-
creased, as is exemplified by the NLRB's decision to withdraw non-
majoritarian bargaining orders from its arsenal of remedies for
employer unfair labor practices. ' Nonmajoritarian bargaining or-
ders, which require the employer to recognize and bargain with a
union even though it has not demonstrated majority status, may be
issued when an employer has engaged in "outrageous and perva-
sive" unfair labor practices." 5 Despite the fact that such orders have
been rarely issued,' t" they probably deter employers from engaging
in extensive unfair labor practices designed to prevent the union
from obtaining majority status."'' This potential benefit of nonma-
1 " Of course, the frequency with which employers use sophisticated union avoidance
tactics or actively resist union organizing does not necessarily indicate that unfair labor
practices were committed. Employers who actively seek to remain nonunion, however, are
more likely to test the limits of the law, and cross the dividing line between lawful and
unlawful behavior.
Gourmet Foods, 270 N. L. R.B. 578 (1984), For a discussion of the significance of this
holding, sec Stickel! & Delaney, Union Organizing and the Reagan NLRB, 5 CoNTEMp. POO,'
ISSUES 28, 39 (1987).
115 Majoritarian bargaining orders are issued when a fair election cannot be held and
the union has demonstrated that it has obtained a majority of employees' authorization cards.
The potential appropriateness of a bargaining order absent a card majority, in the face of
egregious /unfair labor practices, was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. (Asset
Packing Co., 395 U.S, 575, 613-14 (1969).
"" See, e.g„ United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n (II), 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981). In that
case, described as "unquestionably an exceptional one" by the NLRB, id, at 774, the Board
issued a bargaining order even though a card majority had not been obtained. As the Board
noted, "A careful balancing of all the considerations herein indicates that our traditional
remedies would be ineffectual in dissipating the coercive effects of the [employer's] unfair
labor practices." id. at 774-75.
Similar logic was used to grant a nonmajoritarian bargaining order where intimidation
tactics, interrogation, threats of plant closure, discharge, and loss of benefits, discriminatory
discharges, and promises or benefits, among other tactics, were used by the employer to
thwart the union organizing campaign. See Corsair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), enforce-
ment denied in pertinent pare, Comb. Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
" 7 The logic behind this argument is simply that the ability to use non-mqjority bargain-
ing orders yields a probability that, even though an employer may thwart it union's attempt
to organize workers (that is, t he employer may prevent the union from winning an election
or obtaining a card majority), the employer may still be compelled to recognize and negotiate
with that union. Stated more succinctly, as judge Wald insightfully suggested in her Corsair
dissent, "fflor even if the company wins the organizational battle, it may lose the collective
bargaining war." 721 F.2d at 1400 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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joritarian bargaining orders notwithstanding, the NLRB, comprised
of a majority of Reagan appointees, announced in Gourmet Foods
that "under no circumstances" would it issue a nonmajoritarian
bargaining order." 8 In so holding, the Board forfeited an important
deterrent to unfair practices, and thus "employers who offend the
law most egregiously will escape the most.stringent remedy in the
NLRB's arsenal."t 19
The effects of decisions like Gourmet Foods are only com-
pounded by the extensive delays in imposing remedies in the first
place. For example, between the years 1970 and 1978, the median
unfair labor practice case-processing time (from the filing of a
charge until its final disposition by the NLRB) was under 400
days.' 2" Although the median case-processing record rose to be-
tween 400 and 500 days between 1978 and 1981, in the most recent
years for which we have data, this record has worsened to a median
case-processing time of over 600 days. 121 Decisional delay reduces
the likely costs imposed on a party that violates the Act, particularly
when the remedy involves cease and desist orders or the reholding
of an election as much as two to three years after the organizing
drive has begun.
In short, the extensive delays in imposing remedies, the Failure
to raise the costs of remedies, and the continuous challenges posed
by the increasing number and sophistication of employer unfair
labor practices are likely to raise the clamor for stronger, more
effective remedies to even newer heights. In essence, these problems
may force society and labor tribunals to reassess the wisdom behind
the remedial or make-whole philosophy of remedies mandated by
the NLRA and cases interpreting 4.' 22
115 270 N.L.R.B. at 580.
11"Comfit., 721 F.2d at 1355. Interestingly, despite this recognition, the D.C. Circuit was
unwilling to uphold the legitimacy' of the Board's use of a non-majority bargaining order.
12"The source of these data is the annual reports of the National Labor Relations Board.
which have been published every year from 1936 to 1983.
121 Recently, there has been . a backlog in the publication of NLRB Annual Reports. The
most recent report available covers 1983.
22
 The NLRB is given discretion to fashion remedies that effectuate the Act's purposes.
The NLRA states thin:
If upon the preponderance of testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
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V. No-SOLICITATION RULES: AN ANACHRONISM IN THE
TELECOMMUTER'S WORLD
Unlike the challenge of current exclusions from the Act and
the distinctions drawn among employees, the legality of participa-
don plans, the scope of bargaining, and remedial adequacy, new
attacks on the meaningfulness and enforceability of no-solicitation
and no-distribution rules are yet to begin. Nonetheless, these chal-
lenges are on the horizon, given changes in the workplace likely to
accompany an expanding reliance on and use of work station com-
puters, as well as emerging telecommunication networks and ca-
pabilities.
Restrictions on attempts to garner support for a union and to
distribute union literature (termed "no-solicitation" and "no-distri-
bution" rules), enforced during union organizing campaigns, are
built on reasonably fixed notions of time and space. It is well-
established that no-solicitation and no-distribution rules are pre-
sumptively valid if they arc not discriminatorily applied and are
enforced on company premises against: employees on working
time.' 2" As the NLRB observed in Peyton Packing, "working time is
for work." 124 Nevertheless, employees may generally solicit union
support among their peers during nonwork time, such as breaks or
lunch (when they are, in effect, nonworking employees), in nonwork
areas.' 25 The ability to distinguish company premises from territory
outside of the firm, nonworking time from working time, and work
areas from nonwork areas is central to the application and enforce-
ment of these rules. In much the same way, the rule that outside
organizers (nonemployees) may be denied access to an employer's
property when reasonable access to employees may be gained
through other means 12 " is based on the notion that a line between
action including reinstatement of employees with or without hack pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1991).
121 Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1993), enforced, 192 17,2d 1909 (501 Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1994).
12.1 id .
i" Id. Although such rules are presumptively lawful, special circumstances may justify
broader prohibitions of no-solicitation rules. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 223 N.L.R.B.
1246, 1248 (1976); R.E.AViLunsts, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 312-13 n.i3
(1985). Rules against the distribution of union literature on company premises may be more
strict than those that apply to solicitation alone. For a useful summary of these rules, see
R.E. Wria.inms, sumw, at 312-23.
' 2" See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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an employer's property and the area surrounding that property
exists and may be identified. Also embedded in that rule is some
view of what constitutes an alternative reasonable access to employ-
ees.
What the NLRB has discovered over time is that, despite the
relative clarity of these rules, they are not always easy to apply, given
the simplistic notions upon which they are based. As examples of
the large array of questions that have arisen over these rules, the
Board has been forced to deal with issues of whether nonwork time
includes unscheduled breaks,' 27 whether areas occupied by both
nonworking employees and others, such as customers, constitute
nonwork areas for the purposes of such rules,P 28 whether off-duty
employees should be treated as nonemployees (that is, as outside
organizers) or as nonworking employees,' 2" and about what consti-
tutes a reasonable alternate access to etnployees.'"
These questions, among others, the inconsistent ways they have
been answered, the logic behind according presumptive validity or
invalidity to certain rules, and the underlying assumptions about
what is the appropriate balance between employers' property rights
and employees' organizational rights (used to develop these rules)
have generated substantial criticism from legal scholars.'" Yet, more
important for the purposes of this paper, the existence of these
questions illustrates that, at least to some extent, the time and space
constraints of solicitation rules cannot be easily fixed.
127 See I.F. Sales Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 137, 138 (1949), enforced, 188 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1951)
(NLRB held that employees' unscheduled lunch breaks were nonwork time, and therefore
solicitation could not be prohibited lawfully).
Substantial confusion about the treatment of workin g hours and working time has arisen
and whether or nut working time is generally understood to mean the time spent working,
rather than the dine at work. At least partly at issue is whether or nut the employees will
recognize that no-solicitation rules enforced on working dine (which are presumptively
lawful) cannot generally be used to prohibit solicitation by employees on nonwork time.
' 2" The Times Publishing Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 207, '208 (1977) (NLRB held that the
employer could not lawfully prohibit union solicitation in a lobby used by customers).
' 2 " See Tri-County Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976); GTE l.enkurt, Inc.,
204 N.L.R.B. 921, 921 (1973).
"" In fact, it is rarely the case that employees are viewed as inaccessible to outside
organizers (that is, there are no other means of reasonable access to employees). See, e.g.,
Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 446 (1978); see also R.E. WILLIAMS, supra note 125, at
336-44.
' it See, e.g., R.E. WILLIAMS, supra note 125, at 311-45; Dereshinsky, The Solicitation and
Distribution Rules Of The NLRB, 40 U. ON. L. REv. 417 (1971); Gould, Union Organizational
Rights and the Concept of "Quasi-Public" Properly, 49 MINN. L. REV. 505 (1965); Gould, The
Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND, L. REv. 73 (1964).
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But if no-solicitation rules already manifest blind faith in the
fixity of time and space, then the workplace changes associated with
telecommunications networking are likely to provide insurmount-
able obstacles to the application and enforcement of such rules. To
understand the challenges telecommunications pose for solicitation
rules, we need only recognize that interfirm and intrafirrn networks
and systems of electronic mail are accessible by workstation com-
puters, and provide a virtually costless (to the user) and instanta-
neous method of communicating with all users tied into that net-
work. Thus, the use of telecommunications networks may prove to
be a valuable organizing tool for unions.' i 2 At the same time, how-
ever, the advantages of telecommunications may prove disastrous
for solicitation and distribution rules, as they further challenge
definitions of working time, working employees, work areas, and
nonemployees, as well as the demarcation of the line between em-
ployers' property and the area outside of the firm. The precise form
that this challenge will take depends, to a large degree, on whether
the network established is interfirm or interfirm, and whether te-
lecommuters attempt to organize, as discussed below.
A. Intrafirm Networks
Many companies have adopted the technology that enables
computer operators within their firm to contact one another. Al-
though there do not appear to be precise estimates of the number
of such companies or the number of users tied into such networks,
a 1984 study estimated that over 24 million people use computers
at work.'" This number has probably grown since then and will
continue to grow in the future.
But with the growth in the number of users and those having
access to networks will come some thorny questions, as illustrated
by the following example. An employee who uses electronic mail to
notify and rally support on his break time for an upcoming union
meeting will, in effect, be communicating with other operators.
First, because the employee is clearly at his or her workstation, or
in a work area, and the use of electronic mail may be viewed as
akin to the distribution of union materials, may the employer law-
'" Little is currently known about the extent to which unions have organized through
the airwaves. On the other hand, the potential for unionizing telecommuters has been
considered. See Union Membership Redefined: Prospects for "Organized" Telecommuters?, S Mi.:-
commuTw; lbw. 10, 11 (1986).
I " See Census Bureau Report, supra note 55, at 14.
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fully prohibit the employee from this activity? Second, because all
operators will likely not share the same break (or nonwork) time,
then it is probable that this message will appear on the screen of
some number of employees while they are on working time. Are
these grounds for refusing to allow such activity? Third, given that
many employees are able to do some of their work at home' 34 and
are able to access their workplace networks from home terminals,
an at-home employee could attempt to communicate with employ-
ees working on the employer's premises. Will this employee then
be viewed as a nonemployee (or outside organizer) and be lawfully
denied access to the employer's premises? What if this employee
were at work in his or her home (and, therefore, not technically
off-duty) and was taking a "scheduled break" at the time he or she
sent organizing messages to other operators?'" And finally, to com-
plicate these issues even more, what if this employee were at home
and were seeking to organize other employees who were also work-
ing at their homes?
Although this final question raises complex issues dealt with
under the section below on telecommuters' attempts to organize, it
may be sufficient to note here that the question may involve a
determination of whether or not employers' premises or property
extend to off-site locations (such as employees' homes while they
are on-line) for the purpose of no-solicitation rules. In other words,
does the use of intrafirm networks for organizing purposes, which
are financially established and maintained by employers, amount to
an attempt to organize on employers' property, and may these
activities be lawfully restricted by valid no-solicitation rules appli-
cable at the traditional workplace? The essential point of these
questions is to illustrate that current no-distribution and no-solici-
tation rules are probably ill-equipped to address such issues likely
to arise in the telecommunications world.
B. Interfirm Networks and Telecommuters
Further wrinkles in and challenges to the meaningfulness of
solicitation rules, in addition to those discussed in the context of
" 4 See supra note 55. Moreover, a U.S.C. study in 1986 indicated that three percent of
"mid-level" corporate employees in large corporations telecommute to work (that is, they
work at home) at least one day per week. See Niles, Telecommuting: The First 100 Years, 5
TELECOMMUTING REV. I, 3 (1988).
155 For example, the employee might he paid by the hour and given fifteen minutes of
paid break time For every two hours worked.
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intrafirm networks, are introduced by the existence of interfirm
networks and the possibility that telecommuters will attempt to
organize. First, although there are likely fewer interfirm networks
than intrafirm networks in existence, this number could grow if
United States enterprises discovered that some forms of collabora-
tion might be in their own best, long-run interest (and the interest
of the United States economy, in general)."" With the adoption of
these networks, however, will come new opportunities to organize
workers and important questions regarding the restriction of solic-
itation and distribution.
To illustrate these points, we can consider a scenario that could
arise under a widely known interfirm network called BITNET,
developed by the City University of New York. More than 1,000
universities and research establishments are tied into BITNET,
which enables users to send electronic messages and files to users
at: other establishments. Therefore, it might be very easy for a
person at University A to attempt to organize computer operators,
for example, at University B (or many other universities at the same
time) through BITNET. In fact, leaving aside the question of the
organizers' unauthorized or authorized use of the computer facili-
ties, all that might. be required is that the organizer obtain an access
code to University B and its "node" or establishment identification
number; or the organizer may use query facilities or electronic
phone directories to identify the user identifications of employees
at University B currently logged onto the system. The organizer
may then send messages directly to those employees. In either case,
the ease with which this organizer from University A may contact
University B's employees, in terms of both time and cost, will effec-
tively give this outsider the same access to employees that an em-
ployee in University B would have to his or her own colleagues
through an intrafirm network. Perhaps unlike an insider employee's
attempts to solicit support among University B's employees, can the
outsider from University A be lawfully prohibited from gaining
access to or using his or her access to University B's employees?
The answer to this question would seem to depend, at least in part,
on whether or not the organizer is viewed as "trespassing" or en-
croaching on University B's property. In turn, this issue would
16 Collaboration on research anti development and information-sharing might benefit a
domestic industry vis-a-vis its foreign competitors. Of course, the public good aspects of these
networks, as well as the potential antitrust implication, 'night well discourage firms fro th
participating in them.
1022
	
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:987
appear to revolve around whether University B possesses any claim
to the BITNET airwaves received on its property, because the or-
ganizer has not physically crossed any property lines. It cannot be
gainsaid that this issue is likely to pose serious problems, as private
property is a muddy construct in the context of a telecommunica-
tions network. The fact that an interfirm network may well be used
by hundreds of organizations at any one point in time will cause
additional confusion in the area of no-solicitation rules.
In short, interfirm networks such as BITNET, though provid-
ing valuable opportunities to unionize workers (by giving organizers
an almost costless and instantaneous access to employees within and
across many organizations), may pose additional obstacles to the
meaningful application of no-solicitation rules. In addition to cre-
ating challenging time and space problems, these networks also blur
the lines between or among organizations, obfuscating the issue of
who owns what property and of' what private property consists in a
world of telecommunications.
Although it is difficult to imagine that the application of no-
solicitation rules could be even more complex than the examples of
organizing attempts through intra and interfirm networks discussed
above, even further uncertainty and confusion may be caused by
attempts of telecommuters to organize. For if the telecommuter
works exclusively at home (and, therefore, would receive all of his
or her electronic mail at home), then the employers' organizational
boundaries become irrelevant. "Outside" organizing could flourish
in this environment because, in effect, we would either view every
organizer as an outsider or no organizer as an outsider (because no
private property of the employer is at issue). It is indeed challenging
to conceive of a lawful no-solicitation rule that could be promul-
gated in this environment that would completely deny access to a
union organizer. This problem may become moot, however, if te-
lecommuters are viewed as independent contractors and are, there-
fore, denied the protection of the NLRA.' 37
In sum, the above questions may merely be a subset of the
complex issues that will be faced by labor tribunals as they attempt
to apply current no-solicitation and no-distribution rules to a work-
place that is increasingly reliant on computers. Stated simply, the
"air waves" are difficult to pin down; they can escape easy classifi-
cation according to time and space. But even assuming arguendo
197 Sec SUPTa notes 55-58 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of this point.
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that agreement could be reached on organizational boundaries and
on the meaning of working time and work areas among users of
telecommunication technology, such an agreement might amount
to a pyrrhic victory for no-solicitation rules. This is because perhaps
an even greater challenge than how to define what constitutes per-
missible and impermissible solicitations in the telecommunications
world is the question of how to enforce those rules. For although
it is one thing to decide that an employee may not use electronic
mail to solicit union support while working, it is quite another thing
to monitor all of the transmissions of large numbers of employees
in highly automated offices and "mobile" workplaces all of the time.
The enforcement of such no-solicitation and no-distribution rules
may well require a tighter supervision, more akin to the futuristic,
omnipresent "big brother," than we have ever witnessed in industry.
Alternatively, such rules may he neglected altogether.
VI. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
As Hayek has implied, regulations emanating from legislation
almost appear to presuppose that the context in which the law
operates is static.tt" Yet, for a law to retain its vitality or its mean-
ingfulness, it must keep up with the changes in that context. Indeed,
the industrial context is dynamic. It cannot be gainsaid that given
the age of the NLRA, it has been forced to withstand many chal-
lenges posed by changes in the social, political, and economic forces
that shape industry. Among these changes have been shifts from a
manufacturing to a service economy, the globalization of markets,
increasing labor force participation among women, increasing ed-
ucational attainment of employees, and technological advances in-
cluding automation and the development and widespread use of
microprocessing technology, to name just a few. But despite the
gravity of these developments, the words of the NLRA have re-
mained unchanged. Instead, it is presumed that to withstand these
tests of time, labor tribunals have used their ability to alter inter-
pretations of exactly the same statutory language. Indeed, a san-
guine view of these shifting interpretations is that they reflect the
underlying social consensus at any point in time.'"
138 This argument is implicit in much or Hayek's book, supra note 6, Hut see, in particular,
Isis discussion of the "Law of Legislation," id. at 124-44.
14" A less charitable view of these shifting interpretations is that labor tribunals decide
cases in ways that suit their own predilections about which party should be "favored" in the
bargaining context or their own vision of the appropriate place of collective bargaining and
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The fine tuning of labor law that can be achieved through
subtle reinterpretations of statutory language (and rules derived
therefrom), however, may be insufficient to ensure that a labor law
enacted so many years ago is able to keep pace with industrial reality
today. It is the premise of this paper that forces such as the increas-
ing professionalization of the workforce, the blurring of occupa-
tional distinctions, the increasing education and expanding interests
among employees, the continuing challenge to the competitiveness
of United States enterprises, the growing number and sophistication
of employer antiunion tactics, and emerging telecommunications
networks and capabilities have resulted in a new social consensus
that may not be sufficiently accommodated by subtle changes in the
law. I nstead, labor tribunals will be forced to confront directly major
issues involving who should receive and who should be denied the
Act's protections, the legality of employee participation plans, the
scope of the compulsory bargaining obligation, the adequacy of
remedies, and the appropriateness of no-solicitation rules. This
paper has underscored those contentious areas of the law likely to
pose challenges for the future of labor law. But beyond the general
observation that the areas covered here are likely to undergo con-
tinued challenge and future change are two specific but related
observations.
First, a consequence of the neglect by labor tribunals (or even
the legislature) to address these challenges in ways other than on a
case-by-case basis is the destabilization of actual or potential union-
management relationships. Critical uncertainties about who is cov-
ered by the Act, the legality of many union avoidance tactics, and
what must be negotiated at the collective bargaining table, combined
with the lack of deterrence to engage in unfair labor practices, can
only introduce or invite further questioning of an already troubled
labor movement. Moreover, they serve to distract industry from
unions in society. See, e.g., Sockell & Delaney. supra note 114, at 41-13. More generally, it
can be argued that the NLRB has promoted the views of the political administration in
power. Implicit support fur this view may be found in the plethora of articles devoted to a
description of the policies of the NLRB tinder different Presidents. See, e.g., Scher, Regulatory
Agency Control Through Appointment: 7'he Case of the Eisenhower Administration and the NLRB, 23
J. Pot.. 677 (1961); Stern, The Kennedy Policy: A Favorable View, 3 INDUS. REI.. 21 (1964);
Vladeck, The Nixon Board and Retail Bargaining Units, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 416 (1976). For an
empirical study of the favoritism demonstrated by Republican and Democratic appointees to
the NLRB, see Cooke & Gautchi, Political Bias in the NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35
farms. & LAB. REL. REV. 539 (1982).
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meeting the challenge of foreign competition and deregulation""
by encouraging litigation among employers who concentrate instead
on minimizing their bargaining obligations. At a time when some
have argued that competition has never been more fierce, and
management has been held increasingly accountable by constituen-
cies other than labor,"' management's potential preoccupation with
"delegitimizing" organized labor may prove especially costly to em-
ployers and to the United States industry overall.
Second, although it is unclear how labor tribunals will deal with
challenges to no-solicitation rules, based on recent decisions by labor
tribunals in other areas of the law, these controversial aspects of the
law appear to be moving in a similar direction. Specifically, decreases
in the Act's coverage, the scope of mandatory bargaining, and re-
medial effectiveness to discourage unfair labor practices, combined
with more liberal allowance of participation plans or union alter-
natives, are generally unfavorable to unions. In light of the cen-
trality of these areas of the law to the NLRA, this trend would seem
to suggest that the usefulness and appropriate place of unions and
collective bargaining in contemporary society are being challenged.
That underlying questioning, as well as views on the ability and
limitations of workers to contribute directly or indirectly (through
representation) to the organizations for which they work, are both
likely to play roles in shaping the future of labor law in general.
For now, what is clear is that, in deciding just what unions should
do, how they should perform that role, on whose behalf they should
be empowered to act, as well as what protections and advantages
unions should be given to carry out their missions (that is, deciding
questions of bargaining scope, remedies, exclusions, the legality of
participation plans, and the future of solicitation rules) labor tri-
bunals will be forced to reassess the wisdom behind the very fabric
of and assumptions underlying United States labor law.
In the end, regardless of whether or not labor tribunals or
legislators directly confront these challenges, they will be making
"' For a similar conclusion based on different areas of the law, see Gould, Fifty Year,
under the National Labor Relations Ad: A Retrospective View, 37 LAII. 1. J. 235 (1986).
See KUHN & yPIHIVER, MANAGERS AND NEW CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES: SOCIAL. RE
SPONSIBILITY AND A BUSINESS ETHIC FOR TnE, NINETIES (forthcoming). Kuhn and Shriver
argue that it would be in management's best, long-run interest to stop challenging the
legitimacy of constituencies (or refusing to acknowledge their existence), whose support.
management needs to fend off challenges, and demands, from shareholders. See, in partic-
ular, Chapter 5, ''the Socially Responsible, Autonomous Corporation."
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choices about the future of the NLRA and _of unionism. An un-
willingness to take account of industrial developments in the appli-
cation and interpretation of the Act may amount to a willingness to
accept its increasing meaninglessness or inappropriateness in mod-
ern times. Because unionism may still fail to accord with underlying
business norms, narrowly defined, this neglect of the legal frame-
work undergirding collective bargaining may further contribute to
a withering away of unionism.t 4 '2 Alternatively, the choice to rein-
vigorate the NLRA, whether by labor tribunals or legislative recon-
sideration, would reaffirm the value and place of unions in society.
It might he argued that collective bargaining and unions are inconsistent with man-
agement's view of its right to make unilateral decisions in the running of enterprises. This
argument is examined in depth in N.W. CFIAMBERLAIN, UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT
CONTROL (1948); N.W. CHAMBERLAIN, LABOR (1958). As well, it might be argued that collective
action runs contrary to the individualistic achievement orientation of American workers, in
general. For a history and discussion of those attitudes, see S. LII'SET, THF, FIRST NEW NATION
170-99 (1963). Of course, that collective bargaining may be inconsistent with those norms
does not necessarily mean that unions, or the NLRA, which fosters their formulation, are
undesirable. Indeed, one can argue that the NLRA was enacted despite these norms because
the Act and unionism are consistent with other perhaps more widely shared social norms,
such as the institutionalization of conflict, the reduction of disorderly industrial strife, and
the facilitation of employee participation in organizational decision making, among other
norms. Because of a potential conflict in the more narrowly defined business norms (among
managers and employees) and broader social norms, for unionism to continue to thrive, the
vitality of the NLRA would need to be enhanced.
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